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°ª²¹°ù³Ù¾±³¦±ô±ðµ÷¶Ùö³Ù³Ù±ô¾±²Ô²µ:2026:°ù´Ú²õ/³ó³ó²¹²µ051,
author = {Döttling, R and Levit, D and Malenko, N and Rola-Janicka, M},
doi = {rfs/hhag051},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
title = {Voting on public goods: citizens vs shareholders},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag051},
year = {2026}
}
TY - JOUR
AB - We study the interplay between a ``one person-one vote’’ political system and a ``one share-one vote” corporate governance regime. If shareholders push firms for more pro-social policies, political backlash may arise, undoing these initiatives. If public policy is frictionless, shareholder democracy becomes irrelevant: the political system fully offsets shareholder influence. With public policy frictions, pro-social corporations can mitigate regulatory shortcomings and enhance corporate public goods provision. Nevertheless, shareholder democracy can hurt citizens due to the representation problem: it favors the preferences of the wealthy. Investor diversification, pass-through voting, and corporate greenwashing have important implications for these trade-offs of shareholder democracy. (JEL D62, D72, G28, G34, G38, H23)
AU - Döttling,R
AU - Levit,D
AU - Malenko,N
AU - Rola-Janicka,M
DO - rfs/hhag051
PY - 2026///
SN - 0893-9454
TI - Voting on public goods: citizens vs shareholders
T2 - The Review of Financial Studies
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag051
ER -